It is almost cliche: to know the future, study the past.

Anyone under 58 or so, this seems like ancient history, but for the rest of us, it seems like yesterday:

The Soviet Union developed their Yankee and Delta classes of strategic submarines in response to the George Washington class of US submarines, which were equipped with Polaris missiles. The Yankee class is considered the first true Soviet SSBN, despite the earlier Hotel class. Combined with SS-N-6 missiles, the Yankee SSBNs, which became operational in 1967, had an approximate 2500 km range which allowed them to patrol at great distance from the US coasts in the mid-Atlantic.

A few years later, the arrival of the Delta SSBN equipped with SS-N-8 missiles gave the Soviet Union the potential even to launch attacks on the United States from home waters in the Barents Sea. The Northern Fleet came to define the Barents Sea (and later the Sea of Okhotsk) as closed areas for these SSBNs. These ‘Bastions’ became heavily defended by attack submarines, surface vessels and air power.

The strategic nuclear deterrent submarines and the Bastion Concept came to be recognised as the centrepiece of Russia’s second strike capability. However, it is worth remembering that Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) failed in initial attempts in the 1960s to get the political leadership in NATO to focus on the emerging Soviet naval threat in the High North and North Atlantic and to expand the continental focus of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

1960s … 2020s … catching the drift? For the next three decades we built a large portion of our Navy around this one problem.

In September of last year over at Andrew Erickson’s treasure of a webpage, we have this nugget in a translation from the pages of China’s Ordnance Industry Science Technology Journal a translation of an interview with Chi Guocang, a former PLAN submarine officer who taught at the PLAN Submarine Academy who retired in 2018.

It had me pondering a few things:

Staff Reporter: Hello, Professor Chi, some time ago a report released by the U.S. Pentagon stated that for the first time, the Chinese Navy can permanently sustain at least one strategic missile nuclear submarine at sea to perform strategic duty missions. The report also said that this marks the first time that the Chinese Navy has achieved continuous readiness of strategic nuclear submarines. May I ask, what is continuous strategic duty?4

4 Translator’s Note: The staff reporter must be referring to the 2022 China Power Report, which states that “the PRC is conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN-class (Type 094) submarines (SSBNs).” See Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2022), U.S. Department of Defense, November 2022, p. 94.

Professor Chi Guocang: Continuous strategic duty refers to the national “triad” (including land-based, sea-based, and air-based) of strategic nuclear forces being able to operate 24 hours a day in peacetime at any time and under any weather and environmental conditions, with a certain number of nuclear forces able to maintain a high degree of combat readiness, capable at all times of implementing strategic nuclear deterrence against enemy countries at the direction of the supreme command. In wartime, they can conduct nuclear counter-attack against the enemy at any time, as directed by the supreme command.

The continuous strategic duty of strategic nuclear submarines usually means that multiple strategic nuclear submarines jointly ensure that at least one strategic nuclear submarine maintains a state of at-sea readiness duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and under various complex weather and sea conditions, ensuring that at least one strategic nuclear submarine can complete nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack (also called second strike) against enemy countries upon an order from the supreme command.

The continuous strategic duty of strategic nuclear submarines usually means that multiple strategic nuclear submarines jointly ensure that at least one strategic nuclear submarine maintains a state of at-sea readiness duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and under various complex weather and sea conditions, ensuring that at least one strategic nuclear submarine can complete nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack (also called second strike) against enemy countries upon an order from the supreme command.

Staff Reporter: Is it difficult to achieve continuous strategic duty? China has had strategic missile nuclear submarines for many years. Why has the PLAN only recently achieved continuous strategic duty?

Professor Chi Guocang: Whether strategic nuclear submarines can achieve continuous strategic duty is not only related to strategic nuclear submarine weaponry and equipment technology, but also to the quantity and support capabilities for strategic nuclear submarine weapons and equipment. And it has an even greater relationship to the level of readiness training of the strategic nuclear submarine force and its submarine command and control (C2) capabilities. It can be said that in all respects the standards are extremely demanding, and it was not easy for China to achieve it. … …

Staff Reporter: Can China’s number of strategic nuclear submarines meet the criteria you just laid out?

Professor Chi Guocang: A recent U.S. Pentagon research report pointed out that the Chinese Navy currently has six Type 094 strategic nuclear submarines in service and has begun continuous strategic duty. Therefore, we can assume that based on the number of strategic nuclear submarines and the multi-year operational employment mechanism of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and other countries, if China’s strategic nuclear submarine force wants to always have one submarine on duty, then it needs at least a total of four subs. Considering that there is still a gap in the technical level of China’s strategic nuclear submarines, and the scope of the sea area [for SSBN operations] is much larger than that of Britain and France, one boat is not adequate assurance. Six is a more reasonable number to ensure that there is enough redundancy to deal with emergencies.

In the coming years we will need to focus more and more on the subsurface threat from the PLAN:

From this April’s Congressional Research Service report, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress:

The PLAN operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity.”58

…

Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The Type 096 will likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms [i.e., submarines], the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.”

Back to boomers and bastions, my friends.

Not a new insight, from 10 years ago from the Sydney Morning Herald:

China's JL2 submarine ballistic missiles can't reach the continental US from the South China Sea. But China hopes to improve the range of those missiles, which is why analysts think China sees the sea as a future "bastion" for its nuclear submarines.

Bernard D. Cole, a professor at the National War College and a retired US Navy captain, says the Soviets developed the submarine bastion strategy during the Cold War. A spy ring alerted the Soviets to the fact that the US was easily tracking their submarines in the open ocean. So the Soviets created heavily mined and fortified zones for their subs to operate as close to the US as possible. One was in the White Sea of north-west Russia and the other was in the Sea of Okhotsk, north of Japan, Cole said.

Chinese submarines are known for being relatively noisy – and thus easy to detect – making it difficult for them to slip into the western Pacific without being detected. But once China improves the range of its missiles, it won't need to move its submarines out of the South China Sea to pose a retaliatory threat to the US.

Where would their bastions be?

They have a serious challenge, Colin Koh pointed out earlier this year,

The considerable missile and nuclear weapons buildup of the PLA over the decades contributed significantly to the evolving Chinese counterintervention strategy, centered notionally around the operational assumption of at least neutralizing American combat power at the onset of hostilities, and keeping American reinforcements at bay outside the First Island Chain (FIC) [第⼀岛链], all while ensuring that Beijing sufficiently deters Washington from further escalatory moves using its more credible, second-strike nuclear capabilities – arguably in the shape of sea-based deterrent, in particular its expanding nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) capabilities.

They feel most secure close to home, as most continental land powers (like the Soviet Union) do. For them, that would be in the first island chain.

They don’t want to go into the deep Pacific. To get there they have to push through hundreds of nautical miles of coastal shelf, Japanese islands with possible SSK hiding around, and once they get to open waters, thar be dragons…and USN SSN…and skies full of Maritime Patrol Aircraft from a whole host of nation who want nothing more than to track a noisy SSBN in deep waters like there dear, old, Grandad did.

Naw. Scares the crap out of me just thinking about it, but if you look at their submarine base in the Yellow Sea, maybe they do want a bit of that action?

Here it is, just north of the map above, east of Qingdao, in Shandong Province. Just look at it below. I don’t know about you, but that is even worse than what the Soviet North Sea Fleet had to deal with.

I think the PLAN knows this too:

Hainan, a palm-fringed island known as China’s Hawaii, sits in the warm tropical waters of the South China Sea east of Vietnam. It’s a popular tourist destination with soft-sand beaches, quaint mountain villages and fancy seaside resorts. But just 500 feet from the lush grounds of the Holiday Inn Resort Yalong Bay is East Yulin Naval Base, home to Chinese destroyers and nuclear-armed submarines. In the past decade, this island roughly the size of Taiwan has become home to China’s most concentrated buildup of modern military power and the launching point for its aggressive forays into the contested waters of the South China Sea.

Yes, that would be better.

Think about what China has been investing decades in taking and claiming as their own. Is it also kind of place is easy for a submarine to hide with friendly support as backup?

It is conveniently called the South China Sea.

Just look at that bottom topography.

Does the militarized island/base building of the last couple of decades start to make sense now?

There’s your bastion.

Now the Blue challenge is: how do you kill a submarine there that doesn’t want to come out and fight?

Everything old is new again…but the smart minds have known this for a while.

China’s likely reliance on general-purpose forces to protect its SSBNs, especially if Beijing finds it necessary to obtain sea-control capabilities and create SSBN bastions in the South China Sea, would probably heighten the risk of clashes between China’s conventional forces defending its SSBNs and enemy ASW platforms. The likelihood of incidents and inadvertent escalation may be further exacerbated by the technical and logistical difficulties of maintaining effective command, control, and communication systems in a contested maritime environment. The introduction of unmanned systems—whether surface vessels or underwater vehicles—would present further challenges, including the need for effective communication between two camps of hostile forces to avoid incidents.

Where does this eventually lead?

The SSBN will not stay in their bastions. Remember in 1986 when a Soviet Yankee I SSBN had a spot of bother?

That’s right kiddies, SSBNs were right in the middle of the Atlantic off Bermuda. Forget, “We were 30-minutes from Armageddon”. No, that was for the weak-livered.

Those missiles from Yankee and Delta SSBNs would only take 10-15 minutes to reach the East Coast of the USA.

That was the reality of my high school and teen age years.

So, if the Chinese are to follow the patterns of the Russians, watch for their growing SSBNs to spend quality time in their South China Sea bastion.

Should things get furry, they might try to shorten flight times or just test our open ocean ASW capabilities by playing around Guam, Wake, Hawaii, or closer.

You can’t buy training like that.

Just keep an eye on them over the next decade. 50% chance they’ll just stay in their bastions.

However…take a moment and look at the geography again. The Chinese don’t have a lot of waterspace to work with, like most continental land powers. Should a war in the Western Pacific break out, a conventional war, it will be fought in the same place as their SSBN bastion(s). Targeted or not, an enemy submarine if found will be attacked. If you start sinking their strategic nuclear deterrence…that can lead paranoid minds into dark places.

Ponder that as well.

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